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Abstract
Certificates to a linear algebra computation are additional data struc-
tures for each output, which can be used by a—possibly randomized—
verification algorithm that proves the correctness of each output. The
certificates are essentially optimal if the time (and space) complexity of
verification is essentially linear in the input size N , meaning N times a
factor No(1), i.e., a factor Nη(N) with limN→∞ η(N) = 0.
We give algorithms that compute essentially optimal certificates for
the positive semidefiniteness, Frobenius form, characteristic and minimal
polynomial of an n × n dense integer matrix A. Our certificates can be
verified in Monte-Carlo bit complexity (n2 log ‖A‖)1+o(1), where log ‖A‖
is the bit size of the integer entries, solving an open problem in [Kaltofen,
Nehring, Saunders, Proc. ISSAC 2011] subject to computational hardness
assumptions.
Second, we give algorithms that compute certificates for the rank of
sparse or structured n × n matrices over an abstract field, whose Monte
Carlo verification complexity is 2 matrix-times-vector products + n1+o(1)
arithmetic operations in the field. For example, if the n× n input matrix
is sparse with n1+o(1) non-zero entries, our rank certificate can be verified
in n1+o(1) field operations.
This extends also to integer matrices with only an extra log ‖A‖1+o(1)
factor.
All our certificates are based on interactive verification protocols with
the interaction removed by a Fiat-Shamir identification heuristic. The
validity of our verification procedure is subject to standard computational
hardness assumptions from cryptography.
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1 Introduction
Suppose you want to externalize your computations to cloud services. Prior to
payment of the services, it would be desirable to verify that the returned result
has been correctly computed by the cloud servers. This model is economically
viable only if the verification process requires less resources than the computa-
tion itself. It is therefore important to design certificates that can be used to
verify a result at a lower cost than that of recomputing it.
For instance, a primality certificate is a formal proof that a number is prime.
In [18], primality is assessed by presenting a primitive root and the factorization
of m− 1. The latter can be checked fast by remultiplying, and then primitivity
is polynomially checkable.
In linear algebra our original motivation is related to sum-of-squares. By
Artin’s solution to Hilbert 17th Problem, any polynomial inequality ∀ξ1, . . . , ξn ∈
R, f(ξ1, . . . , ξn) ≥ g(ξ1, . . . , ξn) can be proved by a fraction of sum-of-squares:
∃ui, vj ∈ R[x1, . . . , xn], f − g =
(
ℓ∑
i=1
u2i
)
/

 m∑
j=1
v2j

 (1)
Such proofs can be used to establish global minimality for
g = infξv∈R f(ξ1, . . . , ξn) and constitute certificates in non-linear global op-
timization. A symmetric integer matrix W ∈ SZn×n is positive semidefinite,
denoted by W  0, if all its eigenvalues, which then must be real numbers,
are non-negative. Then, a certificate for positive semidefiniteness of rational
matrices constitutes, by its Cholesky factorizability, the final step in an exact
rational sum-of-squares proof, namely
∃e ≥ 0, W [1]  0, W [2]  0, W [2] 6= 0 :
(f − g)(x1, . . . , xn) · (me(x1, . . . , xn)TW [2]me(x1, . . . , xn)) =
md(x1, . . . , xn)
TW [1]md(x1, . . . , xn), (2)
where the entries in the vectors md,me are the terms occurring in ui, vj in (1).
In fact, (2) is the semidefinite program that one solves.
Thus arose the question how to give possibly probabilistically checkable cer-
tificates for linear algebra problems. In [15] the certificates are restricted to
those that are checkable in essentially optimal time, that is, in bit complexity
(n2 log ‖W ‖)1+o(1), where log ‖W ‖ is the bit size of the entries inW . Quadratic
time is feasible because a matrix multiplication AB can be certified by the re-
sulting product matrix C via Rusin Freivalds’s [9] (see also [16]) probabilistic
check: check A(Bv) = Cv for a random vector v.
Note that programs that check their results from [5] have the higher matrix-
multiplication time complexity. In [15] a certificate for matrix rank was pre-
sented, based on Storjohann’s Las Vegas rank algorithm [21], but matrix posi-
tive semidefiniteness remained open. Also the presented certificate for the rank
did not take into account a possible structure in the matrix.
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In the following we solve these two problems. In both cases, positive semi-
definiteness and structured or blackbox matrices, our solution is to use either
interactive certificates under the random oracle model, or heuristics under stan-
dard computational hardness assumptions from cryptography. Removing the
cryptographic assumptions remains however a fundamental open problem. Pro-
viding certificates to other problems, such as the determinant or the minimal
and characteristic polynomial of blackbox matrices, is also open.
In Section 2, we detail the different notions of certification that can be used
and in particular the relaxation we make over the certificates of [15]: in the
certificates presented here, we allow the verifier to provide the random bits used
by the prover, in an interactive manner. We also present in this section the
Fiat-Shamir derandomization heuristic that can turn any interactive certificate
into a non-interactive heuristic certificate.
More precisely, the idea is to devise an interactive protocol for the random
oracle model, and then to replace oracle accesses by the computation of an
appropriately chosen function h [7, 2].
Then we first present in Section 3 an interactive certificate for the Frobe-
nius normal form that can be verified in O(n2+o(1)(log ‖A‖)1+o(1)) binary op-
erations, as in [15], but our new certificate also occupies an optimal space of
O(n2+o(1)(log ‖A‖)1+o(1)) bits. This is an order of magnitude improvement over
[15, Theorem 4]. This certificate can then be used as in the latter paper to certify
the minimal and characteristic polynomial as well as positive semidefiniteness,
while keeping the lower memory requirements. In the same section we also
present another, stand-alone, characteristic polynomial certificate, which can
also be used for positive semidefiniteness, with slightly smaller random evalua-
tion points.
Finally in Section 4 we present a new certificate for the rank of sparse or
structured matrices.
The certificate combines an interactive certificate of non-singularity, giving a
lower bound to the rank, with an interactive certificate for an upper bound to the
rank. Overall the interactive certificate for the rank requires only 2Ω + n1+o(1)
arithmetic operations over any coefficient domain, where Ω is the number of
operations required to perform one matrix-times-vector product.
This certificate is then extended to work over the integers with only an extra
log ‖A‖1+o(1) factor. For instance, if the matrix is sparse with only n1+o(1) non-
zero elements, then the certificate verification is essentially linear.
2 Notions of certificate
The ideas in this paper arise from linear algebra, probabilistic algorithms, pro-
gram testing and cryptography.
We will in particular combine:
• the notions of certificates for linear algebra of Kaltofen et al. [15], which
extend the randomized algorithms of Freivalds [9],
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and reduce the computation cost of the program checkers of Blum and
Kannan [5],
• with probabilistic interactive proofs of Babai [1] and Goldwasser et al. [13],
• as well as Fiat-Shamir heuristic [7, 2] turning interactive certificates into
non-interactive heuristics subject to computational hardness.
We first recall some of these notions and then define in Section 2.3 what we
mean by perfectly complete, sound and efficient interactive certificates.
2.1 Arthur-Merlin interactive proof systems
A proof system usually has two parts, a theorem T and a proof Π, and the
validity of the proof can be checked by a verifier V . Now, an interactive proof,
or a
∑
-protocol, is a dialogue between a prover P (or Peggy in the follow-
ing) and a verifier V (or Victor in the following), where V can ask a series
of questions, or challenges, q1, q2, . . . and P can respond alternatively with a
series of strings pi1, pi2, . . ., the responses, in order to prove the theorem T .
The theorem is sometimes decomposed into two parts, the hypothesis, or input,
H , and the commitment, C. Then the verifier can accept or reject the proof:
V (H,C, q1, pi1, q2, pi2, . . .) ∈ {accept, reject}.
To be useful, such proof systems should satisfy completeness (the prover
can convince the verifier that a true statement is indeed true) and soundness
(the prover cannot convince the verifier that a false statement is true). More
precisely, the protocol is complete if the probability that a true statement is
rejected by the verifier can be made arbitrarily small. Similarly, the protocol
is sound if the probability that a false statement is accepted by the verifier can
be made arbitrarily small. The completeness (resp. soundness) is perfect if
accepted (resp. rejected) statement are always true (resp. false).
It turns out that interactive proofs with perfect completeness are as powerful
as interactive proofs [10]. Thus in the following, as we want to prove correctness
of a result more than proving knowledge of it, we will only use interactive proofs
with perfect completeness.
On the one hand, if a protocol is both perfectly complete and perfectly sound
then it is deterministic. On the other hand, if at least one of completeness and
soundness is not perfect, then the proof is probabilistic and correspond to Monte
Carlo algorithms (always fast, probably correct).
After submitting our paper to ISSAC, we learned of related work on certify-
ing the evaluation of a Boolean or arithmetic circuit by multi-round interactive
protocols GKR’08 [12] and Thaler’13 [22], where the verifier runs in essentially
linear time in the input size and the prover is limited in compute power. Since
our computational problems in linear algebra can be solved by a Boolean or
arithmetic circuit of size S(n), where S(n) is the bit or arithmetic computation
time, the GKR’08 and Thaler’13 protocols constitute an alternate (implicit)
approach to certification of the output. Those protocols (for multiple rounds)
have smaller communication cost, namely, linear in the depth of the circuit, than
4
ours, which can be linear or quadratic in the matrix dimension. But GKR’08
and Thaler’13 may require a more powerful prover: their provers may require
a factor of O(log(S(n))) or a constant factor more time than S(n). Several of
our certificates are computed faster, in S(n) + o(S(n)) time, where S(n) is the
sequential time, e.g., our certificate for positive semidefiniteness. A technical
condition for the GKR’08 and Thaler’13 verifier is that its complexity depends
linearly on the depth of the circuit, so an algorithm of depth Ω(n2.1) would not
satisfy our requirement of linear complexity for the verifier, but none of our
algorithms have that much depth.
More significantly, our protocols and certificates are explicit: the verifier
need not know the circuit for the computation, nor compute certain proper-
ties of it. Nevertheless, GKR’08 [12] and Thaler’13 [22] guarantee multi-round
protocols, and motivate the search for explicit certificates.
In our explicit setting, we require that the verifier algorithm has lower com-
putational complexity than any known algorithm computing the property.
Moreover, we want the complexity of the prover algorithm as close as possible
to the best known algorithm computing the property without certificates.
2.2 Certificates in linear algebra
For Blum and Kannan [5] a program checker for a program P is itself a pro-
gram C. For any instance I on which program P is run, C is run subsequently.
C either certifies that the program P is correct on I or declares P to be buggy.
There, the programs can be rerun on modified inputs, as in their matrix rank
check, and thus might require more time to check their work than to do the
work itself.
On the contrary, in [14, 15], a certificate for a problem that is given by
input/output specifications is an input-dependent data structure and an algo-
rithm that computes from that input and its certificate the specified output,
and that has lower computational complexity than any known algorithm that
does the same when only receiving the input. Correctness of the data struc-
ture is not assumed but validated by the algorithm. With respect to interactive
proofs, the input/output is related to the property to be proven together with
the commitment. However, as no interaction is possible between the prover
and the verifier, this amounts to using a single round protocol where the prover
sends only the commitment and then the verifier accepts it or not.
In this paper we use a modified version where we allow interactive exchanges
between the prover and the verifier but preserve the requirements on lower total
complexity for the verifier. Moreover, we then can convert back these two-
rounds protocol into one round protocols via Fiat-Shamir heuristic: hash the
input and commitment with an unpredictable and universal hash function (such
as a cryptographic hash function), to simulate the random challenges proposed
by the verifier.
It turns out that it seems easier to design certificates that are interactive than
to design directly single round certificates. This could be related to the power
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of the interactive proof system complexity class (IP) and the probabilistically
checkable proofs (PCP).
2.3 Interactive certificates
There exists ways to reduce interactive proofs with k rounds to interactive proofs
with perfect completeness and 2 rounds, by increasing the verifier’s complexity
by time exponential in k. Here we will limit ourselves to 2 rounds for our
definition of interactive certificates.
More precisely, in the following we use interactive certificates of a given prop-
erty, mainly as two-rounds probabilistic
∑
-protocols with perfect completeness:
1. The prover of a property sends a commitment to the verifier.
2. The verifier sends back a (randomly sampled) challenge, potentially de-
pending on both the property and the commitment.
3. The prover completes the protocol with a response convincing the verifier
of the property.
In order to become an interactive certificate, this two round
∑
-protocol should
then satisfy soundness, perfect completeness and efficiency as follows:
i. The protocol is perfectly complete: a true statement will always be ac-
cepted by the verifier.
ii. The protocol is sound: the probability that a false statement will be ac-
cepted by the verifier can be made arbitrarily small.
iii. The protocol is efficient: the verifier has lower computational complexity
than any known algorithm that computes the true statement when only
receiving the input.
The interactive certificate can also be said to be essentially optimal when the
verifier needs only time and space complexity of the same order of magnitude
as the size of the input and output to verify the latter.
With this relaxed model, we are able in the following to improve on some
space complexities for integer linear algebra problems and also on time com-
plexities for some problems over generic domains, like the rank of blackbox
matrices.
2.4 Fiat-Shamir derandomization into a single heuristic
round
In a practical perspective (say when using a compiled library, rather than an
interpreter; or when posting the certificate in question) it is not always pos-
sible for the verifier (a user wanting a result) to interact with the prover (the
program).
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Then, there is always the possibility to transform an interactive certificate
into a non-interactive heuristic. Here we use the strong Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic [7, 2, 3], where the random challenge message of the verifier is replaced by a
cryptographic hash of the property and the commitment message. In practice,
the cryptographic hash can be used as a seed for a pseudo-randomly generated
sequence that the prover can generate a priori. For an a posteriori verification,
the verifier decides whether to accept or not the certificate, as in two rounds
interactive protocols, but has also to check that the challenge used by the prover
has really been generated using the input and commitment as seeds.
In this setting, breaking the protocol is somewhat equivalent to breaking the
cryptographic hash function: finding a combination of input and false commit-
ment that will be accepted by the verifier relates to knowing in advance some
parts of the output of the hash function. See for instance Section 4.5 where
breaking the protocol is equivalent to predicting the value of some bits in a
hash, and that can for instance be used to factor integers if Blumb-Blum-Shub
hash function is used.
Note that it is important to use the strong heuristic that uses a combination
of both the input and the commitment for the hashing. See for instance Sec-
tion 3.2 where we need the result itself to be part of the seed in order to obtain
a correct certificate.
3 Reducing space with respect to non-interactive
certificates over the integers
3.1 Interactive certificate for residue systems
In [15, Theorem 5], the given certificates for the rank and determinant of an
integer matrix are essentially optimal whereas the certificates for the Frobenius
normal form (without transformation matrices), the characteristic and mini-
mal polynomial and positive semidefiniteness are not: they require residue sys-
tems that occupies cubic bit space whereas the input and results occupy only a
quadratic number of bits.
Those residue systems allow the verifier to check an integer matrix factoriza-
tion (A = LU for Gaussian elimination or A = SFS−1 for the Frobenius form)
where the resulting factors are in general of cubic size (quadratic number of
entries but each one with linear magnitude) via Freivalds’ certificate. The trick
is to store these factorizations modulo many distinct primes. Then if the integer
matrix factorization is not correct it means that A − LU (resp. A − SFS−1)
is non zero. Therefore, from a bound on the maximal possible size of this dif-
ference (roughly cubic), it cannot be zero modulo a large number of primes.
Consequently, if the set of distinct primes is larger than the bound, selecting a
random prime p in the set and checking whether A−LU (resp. A− SFS−1) is
zero modulo p would reveal the false statement with high probability.
Our idea here is to use several rounds interactive certificates: instead of
storing the factorizations modulo many distinct primes, just compute them on
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demand of the verifier. The verifier has just to select random primes and the
prover will respond with the factorization modulo these primes.
Theorem 1. Let A ∈ Zn×n. There exists an interactive certificate for the
Frobenius normal form, the characteristic or minimal polynomial of A. The
interactive certificate can be verified in n2+o(1)(log ‖A‖)1+o(1)
bit operations and occupies n2+o(1)(log ‖A‖)1+o(1) bit space.
Proof. Use the same algorithm as in [15, Theorem 4] but replacing the random
choice by the verifier of a given tuple (p, Sp, Fp, Tp) (where Tp ≡ S−1p mod p) by
the choice of a random prime p by the verifier and a response of a corresponding
(Sp, Fp, Tp) modulo p by the prover.
Corollary 1. There exists a non-interactive heuristic certificate for the Frobe-
nius normal form, the characteristic or minimal polynomial that occupy the
same space and can be verified in the same time.
Proof. We use Fiat-Shamir. The prover:
1. computes the integer Frobenius normal form F (or the characteristic or
minimal polynomial) over the integers;
2. then he chooses a cryptographic hash function and a pseudo-random prime
generator;
3. he computes the hash of the input matrix together with the result;
4. this hash is used as a seed for the pseudo-random prime generator to
generate one (or a constant number of) prime number(s);
5. the prover finally produces the Frobenius normal form and the change of
basis modulo that prime(s).
The certificate is then composed of the input, the output, the hash function,
the pseudo-random prime generator, the generated prime numbers and the as-
sociated triples (Sp, Fp, Tp).
The verifier then:
1. checks that the hash function and the pseudo-random prime generator are
well-known, cryptographically secure, functions;
2. checks that he can recover the primes via hashing the combination of the
input and the output;
3. and verifies the zero equivalence modulo p of (F −Fp) mod p, (SpTp− I)
mod p and (SpFpTp −A) mod p.
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3.2 Direct interactive certificate for the characteristic poly-
nomial and positive definiteness of integer matrices
In [15], the certificate for characteristic polynomial occupies roughly n3+o(1) bit
space as it requires the Frobenius matrix normal form with a similarity residue
system with primes bounded by O(n(log(n) + log ‖A‖)).
As shown in Theorem 1, with an interactive certificate and a random oracle
for the choice of prime numbers of the latter size, this yields an interactive
certificate with only n2+o(1) bit space requirements.
We propose in the following Figure 1 a simpler certificate, still relying on
the determinant certificate, but with evaluation points bounded only by O(n).
This gives a similar but smaller o(1) factor in the complexity.
Peggy V ictor
Input A ∈ Zn×n
Commitment g ∈ Z[X ] = charpolyA
1 : g(X)
// degree(g)
?
= n
Challenge
2 : λ
oo λ ∈ Z
Response δ ∈ Z = det(λI −A) 3 : δ // δ ?= g(λ)
C : Cert(δ = det(λI −A)) 4 : C // δ ?= det(λI −A)
Figure 1: Interactive certificate for the characteristic polynomial
Theorem 2. For A ∈ Zn×n, the interactive certificate of Figure 1 for the char-
acteristic polynomial is sound, perfectly complete and the number of operations
performed by the verifier, as well as the bit space required to store this certificate,
is bounded by n2+o(1)(log ‖A‖)1+o(1).
Proof. For the determinant certificate we use [15, Theorem 5] whose complexity
matches that of the present theorem.
If Peggy is honest then the definition of the characteristic polynomial yields
charpolyA = det(XI −A) and thus the protocol is perfectly complete.
If Peggy is dishonest then g − charpolyA being of degree at most n, it has
at most n roots. Thus if Victor samples random elements among the first say
cn integers, after the commitment g, the probability that Victor accepts the
certificate is less than 1/c. If the protocol is repeated k times with independent
draws of λ, then the probability that Victor accepts it k times is lower than(
1
c
)k
and therefore the protocol is sound.
For the complexity, one chooses a constant c > 2 so that λ has O(log(n))
bits. Thus δ, as the determinant of λI − A, is bounded by Hadamard’s bound
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to O(n log(‖A‖+ n)) bits. With Horner evaluation and Chinese remaindering,
the check g(λ)
?
= δ can thus be performed in less than O(n2 log(‖A‖ + n))
operations. This is within the announced bound.
Corollary 2. Let A be an n × n symmetric matrix having minors bound HA
of bit length log2(HA) = n
1+o(1). The signature of A can be verified by an
interactive certificate in n2+o(1) binary operations with a n2+o(1) bit space char-
acteristic polynomial certificate. Thus the same certificate serves for positive or
negative definiteness or semidefiniteness.
Proof. We just use the certificate of [15, Corollary 1] but replace their character-
istic polynomial certificate by the interactive one of Figure 1 and Theorem 2.
4 Interactive certificate for the rank of sparse
matrices
Now we turn to matrices over any domain and count arithmetic operations
instead of bit complexity. That is to say we consider that the four arithmetic
operations over the domain, plus say equality testing, random sampling of one
element, etc., are all counted as 1 operation.
For the sake of simplicity we will use the notation F as for finite fields but
the results are valid over any abstract field, provided that the random sampling
is done on a finite subset S of the domain.
We improve on O(n2) certificates for the rank (given with say an LU factor-
ization), when the matrix is sparse, structured or given as blackbox. That is to
say when the product of the matrix by a vector requires strictly less arithmetic
operations than what would be required if the matrix was dense.
If the matrix is given as a blackbox, then the only possible operation with
the matrix is the latter matrix-times-vector product.
For a matrix of rank r, if Ω is the cost of one of those matrix-times-vector
product, the blackbox certificates of [19] would also require O(nr) extra arith-
metic operations and at least O(r) extra matrix-times-vector products for a
total of O(rΩ + nr) arithmetic operations.
In the following we show that it is possible to reduce the time and space
complexity bounds of verifying certificates for the rank of blackbox matrices to
only 2Ω + n1+o(1) arithmetic operations. This is essentially optimal, e.g. for
sparse matrices, as reading and storing a matrix of dimensions n×n should also
require O(Ω + n) operations.
We then extend this result, but in bit complexity, to also certify the rank of
integer matrices with essentially the same optimal complexity bounds.
We proceed in two steps. First we certify that there exists an r × r non-
singular minor in the matrix. Second, we precondition the matrix so that it
is of generic rank profile and exhibit a vector in the null-space of the leading
(r + 1)× (r + 1) minor of the preconditioned matrix.
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4.1 Certifying non-singularity
Peggy V ictor
Input A ∈ Fn×n
Commitment
1 : non-singular
//
Challenge
2 : b
oo b ∈ Sn ⊂ Fn
Response w ∈ Fn 3 : w // Aw ?= b
Figure 2: Blackbox interactive certificate of non-singularity
Theorem 3. Let S be a finite subset of F with at least two distinct elements.
For A ∈ Fn×n, whose matrix-times-vector products costs Ω operations in F, the
interactive certificate of Figure 2 for non-singularity is sound, perfectly complete
and the number of arithmetic operations performed by the verifier is bounded by
Ω+ n1+o(1).
Proof. If Peggy is honest, then she can solve the system with an invertible
matrix and provide w = A−1b to Victor. Therefore the protocol is perfectly
complete.
If Peggy is dishonest, then it means that A is singular. Therefore, it means
that the rank of A is at most n− 1.
We use, e.g., Gaussian elimination to get A = PLUQ, where P and Q
are permutation matrices, L is unit invertible lower triangular and U is upper
triangular. As the rank of A is at most n − 1, U is of the form [ U1 U20 0 ] where
U1 ∈ F(n−1)×(n−1) is upper triangular. One then sees that making the system
inconsistent is equivalent to setting to zero at least the last entry of L−1P−1b
in Fn.
Thus, with probability at least 1 − 1/ |S|, the challenge vector proposed by
Victor makes the system inconsistent∗. In the latter case, Peggy will never be
able to find a solution to the system.
Thus Victor can accept the certificate of Peggy only when he has randomly
found a consistent vector. The probability that this happens k times with k
independent selections of b is bounded by 1
|S|k
. Therefore, when the matrix
is singular, Victor can accept repeated applications of the protocol only with
negligible probability and the protocol is sound.
∗Alternatively, one can get the same result with the Schwartz-Zippel lemma applied to the
linear function whose kernel is the nullspace of A as in e.g. [11, Theorem 2.2].
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For the complexity, Victor needs to perform one matrix-times-vector product
with A, of arithmetic complexity Ω. Victor also needs to produce a random
vector of size n of elements in S and perform a vector equality comparison.
4.2 Certifying an upper bound for the rank
For an upper bound, we precondition A ∈ Fm×n of rank r so that the leading
r×r minor of the preconditioned matrix is non-zero and then present a non-zero
vector in the nullspace of the r + 1 leading minor. We use the butterfly proba-
bilistic preconditioners of [6, Theorem 6.3] that can precondition an n×nmatrix
of rank r so that the first r rows of the preconditioned matrix become linearly
independent with high probability. We denote by Bn×nS the set of such butterfly
networks composed by less than n(log2(n)) switches of the form
[
1 α
1 1 + α
]
,
for α ∈ S ⊂ F. Choosing a random butterfly reduces to choosing an element α,
a row index and a column index for each of its switches.
[6, Theorem 6.3] works for square matrices but can easily be extended to
work for rectangular matrices as follows.
Lemma 1. Let F be a field and S be a finite subset of F. Let A be an m × n
matrix over F with r linearly independent rows. Then a butterfly preconditioner
U ∈ Bm×mS will make the first r rows of UA linearly independent with probability
not less than 1− r⌈log2(m)⌉|S| .
Proof. From [6, Theorem 6.2], we know that a depth ⌈log2(m)⌉ butterfly net-
work can switch any r ≤ m indices into the continuous block 1, 2, . . . , r. The
proof of [6, Theorem 6.3] uses the butterfly to permute and combine the rows
of A independently of its number of columns. Therefore UA will have its first r
rows linearly independent with probability not less than 1− r⌈log2(m)⌉|S| .
We can thus now turn to our interactive certificate of an upper bound to the
rank.
Peggy V ictor
Input A ∈ Fm×n
Commitment rank(A) ≤ r < min{m,n} 1 : r //
Challenge
2 : U, V
oo U ∈ Bm×mS , V ∈ Bn×nS , S ⊂ F
Response w ∈ Fr+1 6= 0 3 : w // w
?
6= 0
[Ir+1|0]UAV
[
Ir+1
0
]
w
?
= 0
Figure 3: Blackbox interactive certificate for an upper bound to the rank
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Theorem 4. Let A ∈ Fm×n, whose matrix-times-vector products costs Ω oper-
ations in F and let S be a finite subset of F with |S| > 2min{m,n}(⌈log2(m)⌉+
⌈log2(n)⌉). The interactive certificate of Figure 3 proving an upper bound for the
rank of A is sound, perfectly complete and the number of arithmetic operations
performed by the verifier is bounded by
Ω + (m+ n)1+o(1).
Proof. If Peggy is honest this means that the rank of A is upper bounded by
r < min{m,n}. Thus the rank of M = [Ir+1|0]UAV
[
Ir+1
0
]
∈ F(r+1)×(r+1) is
also upper bounded by r. Therefore, there exist at least one non-zero vector w
in the nullspace of M . Hence Peggy can produce it and the protocol is perfectly
complete.
If Peggy is dishonest, this means that the rank of A is at least r + 1.
Now, from Lemma 1, the butterfly preconditioner U ∈ Bm×mS will make the
first r+1 rows of UA linearly dependent with probability less than (r+1)⌈log2(m)⌉|S| .
Similarly the butterfly preconditioner V ∈ Bn×nS will make the first r+1 columns
of AV linearly dependent with probability less than (r+1)⌈log2(n)⌉|S| . Overall
the (r + 1) × (r + 1) leading principal minor of UAV will be non-zero with
probability at least 1 − (r+1)(⌈log2(m)⌉+⌈log2(n)⌉)|S| . The latter is greater than
1 − min{m,n}(⌈log2(m)⌉+⌈log2(n)⌉)|S| ≥ 12 . In this case the minor is invertible and
Peggy will never be able to produce a non-zero vector in its kernel. The only
possibility for Victor to accept the certificate is thus that the leading minor is
zero and the probability that this happens k times with k independent selections
of U and V is thus bounded by 12k . Thus Victor can accept repeated applica-
tions of the protocol only with negligible probability and the protocol is sound.
For the complexity, [6, Theorem 6.2] gives us that butterflies of respective
sizes m⌈log2(m)⌉/2 and n⌈log2(n)⌉/2 are sufficient.
Victor thus needs to produce (m⌈log2(m)⌉/2 + n⌈log2(n)⌉/2) random ele-
ments in S and also O(log2(m)+ log2(n)) random bits for the row and columns
indices. Then the successive applications of U , A and V to a vector cost no
more than 3m⌈log2(m)⌉/2 + Ω+ 3n⌈log2(n)⌉/2 arithmetic operations.
Remark 1. Over small fields,
it might not be possible to find a sufficiently large subset S. Then one can
use extension fields or change the preconditioners. For instance, U˜ ∈W(r+1)×m,
and respectively V˜ ∈Wn×(r+1), can be taken as sparse matrix preconditioners,
as in [23] (see also [6, Corollary 7.3]), and replace respectively [Ir+1|0]U and
V
[
Ir+1
0
]
. They are randomly sampled with the Wiedemann distribution,
denoted by W, and have thus not more than 2n(2 + log2(n))
2 non zero entries
with probability at least 1/8, [23, Theorem 1].
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4.3 Blackbox interactive certificate for the rank
Now we can propose a complete certificate for the rank.
If the matrix is full rank, then it is sufficient to produce a certificate for a
maximal lower bound. Otherwise, it will use a non-singularity certificate on a
sub-matrix of dimension r × r together with an upper bound certificate: for a
matrix A ∈ Fm×n,
1. Peggy computes I(r) ∈ Fm×m and J (r) ∈ Fn×n row and column subsets
of A such that I(r)AJ (r) is non singular and produce the non-singularity
certificate of Figure 2 on the latter. This provides a certified lower bound
for the rank of A.
2. Peggy provides the certificate for an upper bound r of the rank of A of
Figure 3.
3. With certified lower bound r and upper bound r, the rank is certified.
Using Theorems 3 and 4, we have proven:
Corollary 3. Let A ∈ Fm×n, whose matrix-vector products costs Ω operations
in F and let S be a finite subset of F with |S| > 2min{m,n}(⌈log2(m)⌉ +
⌈log2(n)⌉). The above
∑
-protocol provides an interactive certificate for the rank
of A. This interactive certificate is sound, perfectly complete and the number of
arithmetic operations performed by the verifier is bounded by
2Ω + (m+ n)1+o(1).
4.4 Blackbox interactive certificate for the rank of integer
matrices
This rank certificate can also be used for integer matrices, at roughly the same
cost: just use the sparse certificate modulo a randomly chosen prime p.
Let H = min{√nm||A||m∞,
√
m
n||A||n∞} be Hadamard’s bound for the invari-
ant factors of A. Let h = log2(H), there cannot be more than h primes reducing
the rank. Therefore, the protocol is as follows:
1. Peggy produces the rank r of A.
2. Victor selects p randomly from a set with, say, c ·h primes, for a constant
c > 2 (if the rank is correct then the probability that the rank of A will
be reduced modulo p is then less than 1/2).
3. Peggy produces the sparse rank certificate of Corollary 3 over the field of
integers modulo p, that is, two vectors w1 ∈ Z/pZn and w2 ∈ Z/pZr+1.
4. Victor checks the certificate of the rank modulo p (to apply A in Z/pZ,
Victor applies A over Z and then reduces the resulting vector modulo p).
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Theorem 5. Let A ∈ Zm×n, whose matrix-times-vector products costs Ω arith-
metic operations in Z.
Let µ = max{log ‖A‖, log(m + n) + log( 1
2
log(m + n) + log ‖A‖)}. The above∑
-protocol provides an interactive certificate for the rank of A. This inter-
active certificate is sound, perfectly complete and the number of bit operations
performed by the verifier is bounded by
(
2Ω + (m+ n)1+o(1)
)
µ1+o(1)
Proof. From the prime number theorem, we know that the h-th prime number is
O(h log(h)). Therefore it is possible to sample c ·h distinct primes of magnitude
bounded by O(h log(h)). Then, the cost of fast arithmetic modulo any of these
primes can be bounded by η = O(log(h)1+o(1))
bit operations. Then µ1+o(1) ≥ max{log ‖A‖, η}1+o(1) and applying A to a
vector in Z/pZ costs no more than Ωµ1+o(1) binary operations. Reducing the co-
efficients of the resulting vector modulo p then costs (log(m) + log ‖A‖+ η)1+o(1),
that is not more than the matrix-times-vector product.
From Corollary 3, the cost of the certificate becomes 2Ωµ1+o(1) + (n +
m)η1+o(1).
Completeness is ensured from Corollary 3 and soundness by the fact that
the number of primes reducing the rank is less than h. Indeed, if Victor then
samples from c · h primes with c > 2, he can accept k repeated wrong ranks
with probability bounded by 1
2k
.
Note that if the matrix is sparse with (m + n)1+o(1) elements, then Ω is
(m + n)1+o(1) and the overall cost of the rank interactive certificate over the
integers remains essentially linear in the input size (m+ n) log ‖A‖.
4.5 Reducing breaking the random oracle to factorization
Now we look at the derandomization of the previous certificates using the strong
Fiat-Shamir heuristic, see Section 2.4, where the random challenge messages
of the verifier are replaced by a cryptographic hash of the property and the
commitment messages.
First, it is proven in [17] that this methodology always produces digital
signature schemes that are provably secure against chosen message attacks in
the ”Random Oracle Model” – when the hash function is modeled by a random
oracle. In other words, it is equivalent for a dishonest Peggy to e.g. produce
consistent systems for singular matrices or to break the random oracle.
Second, we can, e.g., use the Blumb-Blum-Shub perfect random genera-
tor [4]: it transforms a seed x0 (for us the matrix) into a bit string b1, . . . , bk
with bi = xi mod 2; xi+1 = x
e
i mod N for some RSA public key (e,N). It is
for instance shown in [8] that knowing a number of bi’s polynomial in the size of
N , say a number BN = O((logN)
γ) bits, enables one to factor it. Now, we show
next that forging a consistency certificate Ax
?
= b is equivalent to predicting the
value of at least one bit of the random right-hand side vector b.
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Lemma 2. Forging the non-singularity certificate fixes at least one bit of the
random right-hand side vector.
Proof. A singular matrix A ∈ Fn×n has rank at most n − 1. Write it as A =
P [ 0 0L ]UQ where P and Q are permutation matrices, L ∈ F(n−1)×(n−1) is lower
triangular and U is unit invertible upper triangular. Then if Aw = b, it means
that [ 0 0L ] z = P
−1b for z = UQw. Therefore, the first entry of P−1b must be
zero.
Therefore, we fix the RSA modulus N and require as a certificate that the
consistency check is repeated BN times. When the protocol is repeated with
Fiat-Shamir derandomization, we use as successive random vectors b, the hash
of
the input and the previous iteration. If Peggy can find a matrix A of dimen-
sion n (polynomial in the size of N) for which she can forge the BN repeated
applications of the certificate, then
she can predict BN bits of the Blumb-Blum-Shub hashes in O(BN (Ω +
n1+o(1))) operations. Thus Peggy can factor N in polynomial time.
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